Motivated by the emergence of popular service-based two-sided markets where sellers can serve multiple buyers at the same time, we formulate and study the two-sided cost sharing problem. In two-sided cost sharing, sellers incur different costs for serving different subsets of buyers and buyers have different values for being served by different sellers. Both buyers and sellers are self-interested agents whose values and costs are private information. We study the problem from the perspective of an intermediary platform that matches buyers to sellers and assigns prices and wages in an effort to maximize welfare (i.e., buyer values minus seller costs) subject to budget-balance in an incentive compatible manner. In our markets of interest, agents trade the (often same) services multiple times. Moreover, the value and cost for the same service differs based on the context (e.g., location, urgency, weather conditions, etc). In this framework, we design mechanisms that are efficient, ex-ante budget-balanced, ex-ante individually rational, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and ex-ante in the core (a natural generalization of the core that we define here).
Introduction
The recent emergence of the sharing economy has brought renewed interest in the scientific community on studying two-sided markets where, notably, services are traded -such as ride-sharing services like Uber and Lyft and hospitality services like Airbnb. An important characteristic of such markets is the ability of a seller to offer the service to multiple buyers at the same time. For example, Uber Pool and Lyft Line typically assign a driver to multiple riders at the same time; similarly, a house on Airbnb can be offered to multiple tenants based on the specific requirements of each tenant. This is in contrast to the one-to-one assignment that happens in other popular two-sided markets such as Amazon and Ebay.
Central to the design of the above markets are the problems of price and wage computation as well as the assignment of the buyers to the sellers. One classical approach to these problems involving multiple buyers for the same service involves solving a cost sharing problem [14, 15, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, 32] . In such a case, a service provider incurs a cost c(S) for serving a subset S of its customers. In the case of ride-sharing, c(S) is the cost incurred by a cab driver to serve the riders in S. Each rider i values the ride v i which is known only to i. Any utility derived by the rider is v i − p i where p i is the price charged to the rider for the ride. Depending on the pricing mechanism chosen by the ride-sharing platform, a rider has an incentive to misreport her value to derive higher utility. Thus, a cost sharing mechanism decides the assignment and the price each user pays.
The reader may note that in the above one-sided setting, only the values of the users are private while the cost function c(S) of the providers is known to the platform. In this study, we propose and study the two-sided cost sharing problem that generalizes the one-sided setting to the case Infinite time Poly-time 1 submodular seller 1 general seller -Capacitated NGS sellers Submodular sellers approx core approx welfare and core General sellers approx core - Table 1 : Summary of our results.
where the costs are also private information to the sellers and the platform procures their services by offering wages.
A two-sided cost-sharing mechanism is efficient if it maximizes the sum of valuations of all buyers in the assignment minus the cost incurred by the sellers (which is equivalent to the gains from trade); It is dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for every buyer and seller, revealing their true value and cost respectively is a dominant strategy; it is budget-balanced (BB) if, in the assignment, the price realized from all buyers is equal to the wages paid to all the sellers; it is individually rational (IR) if no agent incurs a loss participating in the mechanism; finally, a solution of the mechanism (which consists of an assignment and vectors of wages and prices) is in the core if the utilities of the agents are such that no subset of them can form a coalition and produce welfare higher than their collective utility in the proposed solution.
Two salient features of services in the sharing economy are -a) an agent participates many times in the market and b) the agent types tend to be dependent on environmental and circumstantial parameters (such as the current location, traffic volume in the surrounding area, weather conditions, urgency, etc.) and are not intrinsic to the agents. Therefore, our work focuses on designing twosided cost sharing mechanisms that will satisfy the properties that pertain to agent utilities in expectation. To be more precise, our mechanisms are efficient, dominant strategy IC (DSIC), exante IR, ex-ante BB, and ex-ante in the core. Efficiency and IC are satisfied as their strongest possible versions and BB is a platform constraint that we satisfy. Strenghtening ex-ante IR is not possible even when relaxing IC to Bayesian IC (as given by the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem [30] for the single buyer-single seller case) or even when relaxing efficiency (gains from trade) to approximate efficiency (as shown in [4, 5, 12] , again for a single buyer and a single seller). Moreover, it is conjectured to be impossible even when relaxing both IC and efficiency, as supported by partial impossibility results and experimental evidence [5] . In this sense, our set of properties is not only suitable for our applications of interest, but also sharp from a technical perspective.
Our Results
As we explained above, our main contributions are mechanisms that are efficient, DSIC, ex-ante BB, ex-ante IR, and ex-ante in the core. We present two classes of mechanisms. We begin with the first one in Section 3. The mechanism requires access to certain algorithms as black boxes, which we discuss in Section 3.1. For the most general setting with multiple sellers and arbitrary cost functions, this mechanism is efficient, DSIC, ex-ante BB, ex-ante IR and ex-ante in the approximate core. We show this approximation is tied to the integrality gap of the linear program that solves the optimization version of the problem. The mechanism achieves stronger core guarantees and can also be made to run in polynomial time for certain models:
Single seller In Section 3.2 we focus on the single seller case and show that our mechanism is ex-ante in the core. For the uncapacitated submodular costs case, we are able to make the mechanism run in polynomial time (with an arbitrarily small approximation to the core property) using a sampling approach.
Multiple sellers with negative gross substitutes costs In Section 3.3 we study the case with multiple capacitated sellers with negative gross substitutes (NGS) cost functions. This is an interesting class of functions as it represents the limits of tractability in our setting. We show that the mechanism is ex-ante in the core and that, again, we can use sampling to modify the mechanism so that it runs in polynomial time.
Our second mechanism focuses on the case with multiple sellers under a polynomial running time constraint. We leverage the work in [24] to get a mechanism that is approximately efficient and in the approximate core for the case with submodular cost functions:
Multiple sellers with submodular costs In Section 4 we consider multiple sellers with submodular cost functions and give a polynomial time mechanism that is O( √ m)-approximately efficient and in the O( √ m)-core.
As a necessary step in our mechanisms, we compute utilities in the (approximate) core when the agent types are known. We remark that even this preliminary step is of interest by itself, as it generalizes a result of [3] to our various models. We summarize our results in Table 1 .
Related Work
Our work is related to two areas of literature: two-sided markets and (one-sided) cost sharing. In two-sided markets, a series of papers studies two-sided auctions that approximate efficiency with respect to the sum of values of the items' holders after trade, as opposed to the gains from trade version that we study here [4, 11, 10, 16, 25] . With respect to gains from trade, approximating the optimal gains from trade is impossible in many settings [4, 5, 12] . Nevertheless, there do exist results that impose assumptions on the distributions and/or approximate a weaker benchmark: the gains from trade achieved by the "second-best" mechanism of Myerson and Satterthwaite [30] , which is known to be the one that maximizes gains from trade subject to interim IR and BIC [5, 7, 12, 26] . All these results rely heavily on the fact that the studied settings are single-dimensional and break down even in minor departures from single-dimensionality. Approximating gains from trade even in simple multi-dimensional settings seems like a challenging problem. In a slightly different setting, other works [1, 2] approximate gains from trade with non-atomic populations of agents.
On the cost sharing side of the literature, early work on cooperative games and the core can be found in [6, 19, 33, 34] . Related to our results on computing outcomes in the core for known agent types is the work by Bateni et al. [3] who show how to compute a solution in the core of a game where suppliers deal with manufacturers and all information is public. With a simple transformation, one can show that the model in [3] is equivalent to our model with additive cost functions. In this sense, our results on computing solutions in the core for known agent types generalize the corresponding result of [3] to broader classes of cost functions. Considering mechanisms for one-sided cost sharing, most works focus on the version of the problem where there are no prior distributions on the values of the buyers 1 [15, 17, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32] . The only exception to this rule, is the work by Fu et al. [18] , who consider a Bayesian setting and show that any approximation algorithm for the underlying problem can be transformed into a mechanism for the cost sharing problem with a logarithmic loss in efficiency.
Finally, we note that our mechanisms are related to the AGV mechanism [13] and the mechanisms in [8] , which also achieve ex-ante IR guarantees. The AGV mechanism is efficient, BB, Bayesian IC, and ex-ante IR under certain conditions (such as no costs) which are very different from our setting. The work in [8] focuses on auction settings (including a two-sided auction with a single seller and a single item) and designs mechanisms that are efficient, BB, DSIC, and ex-ante IR. Our mechanisms focus on the richer two-sided cost-sharing setting, in which we provide solutions in the core (an important consideration in our applications of interest as, otherwise, agents are incentivized to deal outside of the market), and also address computational considerations (as they run in polynomial time for various settings).
Preliminaries
Our market model is comprised of a set of m ≥ 1 sellers M and a set of n ≥ 1 buyers N . Each buyer i ∈ N is unit demand and has value v ij for being served by seller j ∈ M . Each seller j ∈ M is endowed with a cost function c j (S) which gives the cost of the seller to serve the buyers in S ⊆ N . We assume that c j (∅) = 0 for all j ∈ M . Optionally, the model can impose a capacity constraint on the sellers with each seller j being able to accept k j buyers. We make the natural assumption that values are bounded and further, without loss of generality and for simplicity of exposition, that they are in [0, 1]. Buyers and sellers interact with an intermediary platform that determines the assignment of buyers to sellers as well as prices p i for the buyers i ∈ N and wages w j for the sellers j ∈ M . The utility of a buyer i that is matched to a seller j is u i = v ij − p i . The utility of a seller who is assigned buyers S is u j = w j − c j (S).
We assume the existence of discrete prior distributions over the types of each buyer and seller. The type of a seller specifies her cost function whereas the type of a buyer specifies her values. We assume agent types are drawn independently and that the prior distributions are common knowledge. The solution that the platform needs to come up with is specified as an assignment of buyers to sellers, a price vector for the buyers, and a wage vector for the sellers. Throughout the paper we describe the assignment both as a collection of buyer subsets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m , with S j being the set assigned to buyer j ∈ M , and as a mapping function σ(·), with σ(i) being the seller to which buyer i ∈ N is assigned.
We next describe the mechanism properties that appear in our results.
Efficiency A mechanism is efficient if it maximizes social welfare, i.e., the total value of matched buyers minus the total cost of sellers. A mechanism is α-efficient if it achieves an α approximation to the social welfare.
Budget balance (BB)
A mechanism is ex-ante (weakly) BB if the expected sum of prices extracted from the buyers is equal to (at least) the expected sum of wages paid to the sellers.
Individual rationality (IR)
A mechanism is ex-ante IR if every agent has non-negative expected utility before all types are drawn. We say a mechanism is ǫ ex-ante IR if the agent expected utilities budget balance. A simple example with a buyer with a large value v and a seller with 0 cost is enough to see that.
The only price and wage that make this setting efficient and truthful are a price of 0 for the buyer and a wage of v for the seller.
are at least −ǫ.
Incentive compatibility A solution is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if an agent cannot improve her utility by misreporting her type, even after learning the types of other agents.
In addition to these standard properties, we are interested in obtaining solutions that are in the core of the cost-sharing game, something that would encourage agents to adhere to the platform's solution and stay in its market.
Cost-sharing core A solution is in the core if the sum of buyer and seller utilities equals the welfare they produce and there does not exist a coalition of buyers and sellers who can generate welfare higher than the sum of their utilities. More generally, the α-core requests that every set of agents can't produce welfare higher than α times their total utilities.
Before moving forward with presenting our results, we define the classes of submodular and negative gross substitutes seller cost functions, which will be the focus of some of our results. For the latter, we begin with the standard gross substitutes definition and then present the negative gross substitutes definition and how it is placed in our framework.
Submodular cost functions A cost function c is submodular if for every subsets of buyers
Gross substitutes functions A function f defined over a set of items U satisifies the gross substitutes condition if and only if the following holds. Let p be a vector of prices for the items and let D(p) = arg max S⊆U {f (S) − i∈S p i } be the demand set. Then, for every price vector p, every S ∈ D(p), and every q ≥ p, there exists a set T ⊆ N such that (S \ A) ∪ T ∈ D(q), where A = {i ∈ N : q i ≥ p i } is the set of items for which the prices increase from p to q.
Negative gross substitutes cost functions in two-sided cost-sharing A seller cost function, which maps each subset of buyers S ∈ 2 N to the real cost c(S), satisifies the negative gross substitutes condition if and only if the following holds. Let p be a vector of prices charged to the buyers and let D(p) = arg max S⊆N c(S) − i∈S p i . Then, for every price vector p, every S ∈ D(p), and every
The class of functions satisfying the gross substitutes property contains, for example, all additive and unit-demand functions and is contained in the class of submodular functions. To abbreviate, we will say that a function is (negative) GS if it satisfies the (negative) gross substitutes condition.
Efficient Mechanism
In this section we describe the main mechanism for most of the settings we study. The mechanism requires access to two algorithms: a) an algorithm to compute a welfare-maximizing assignment of buyers to sellers with known values and costs and b) a deterministic algorithm to compute nonnegative utilities that are in the (approximate) core of the cost-sharing game and sum up to the optimal welfare, again, with known values and costs. We discuss these algorithms further in Section 3.1 and in the sections that correspond to the different models we study. For the polynomial time version of our mechanism, both of these algorithms must run in polynomial time. Let welfare-alg be the welfare maximizing algorithm and let core-alg be the algorithm that computes utilities in the α-core. The exact value of α will depend on the exact model, i.e., on the number of sellers and the class of cost functions under consideration. We now present our mechanism, which is a VCG-type mechanism [9, 21, 35] .
Mechanism 3.1. Specifics:
• Allocation Rule: Given the reported values v ij for i ∈ N, j ∈ M , and cost functions c j : 2 N → R for j ∈ M , output the welfare-maximizing allocation computed by welfare-alg.
• Pre-processing: For every realization of agent types r that has some probability q r , compute buyer utilities y r i , i ∈ N, and seller utilities z r j , j ∈ M , that are non-negative, in the α-core, and sum up to the optimal welfare using core-alg. Let y i = r q r y r i , be the expected utility of buyer i over all realizations and let z j = r q r z r j , be the expected utility of seller j over all realizations.
• Buyer prices: The price charged to buyer i is
where S j is the set of buyers assigned to seller j and σ(i ′ ) is the seller that i ′ is assigned to.
• Seller wages: The wage paid to seller j is
where S j is the set of buyers assigned to seller j and σ(i) is the seller that i is assigned to. Proof. We first show the mechanism is DSIC. We can then assume that the agents reveal their true types when discussing the remaining properties. Letv ij for i ∈ N, j ∈ M , andĉ j (·) for j ∈ M , be the reported values and cost functions. The utility of buyer i who is matched to some seller σ(i) will be
The utility of seller j will be
In both cases we get that the utility is the welfare shifted by a contant term that depends on the y and z vectors. Since the mechanism will pick the allocation that maximizes welfare, we get that it is in the best interest of the agent to reveal her true information. Efficiency follows trivially by the fact that we output the welfare-maximizing allocation of welfare-alg.
To prove the mechanism is ex-ante IR we show that the expected utility of any buyer and seller is non-negative. The expected utility of a buyer i is
where the σ(·) and S j , j = 1, 2, . . . , m, represent the optimal assignment for each realization. If we call W the expected optimal welfare, we get
Similarly for a seller j we get
This proves ex-ante IR.
Ex-ante BB follows from the fact that the expected sum of utilities equals the produced welfare:
This implies the total money paid out to sellers is in expectation equal to the total money extracted from the buyers. Switching to the ex-ante α-core property, as we saw in the previous paragraph, our mechanism guarantees expected utility y i to each buyer i ∈ N and expected utility z j to each seller j ∈ M . For every set S that contains buyers S N and sellers S M , let W r (S) be the welfare the set can produce under realization r. Then
by the fact that vectors y r , z r are given by core-alg. Taking the weighted average of this inequality with respect to the probabilities q r shows that
which proves the ex-ante α-core property.
We now modify our mechanism to make it run in polynomial time (assuming welfare-alg and core-alg run in polynomial time).
Mechanism 3.3. Specifics:
• Pre-processing: Sample a set C of c = n 2 (n + m) 5 /ǫ 3 realizations of agent types, for some small parameter ǫ > 0. For every sample r ∈ C, compute buyer utilities y r i , i ∈ N, and seller utilities z r j , j ∈ M , that are non-negative, in the α-core, and sum up to the optimal welfare using core-alg. Let
be the slightly shifted average utility of buyer i over all sampled realizations and let
be the slightly shifted average utility of seller j over all sampled realizations.
where S j is the set of buyers assigned to seller j and σ(i) is the seller that i is assigned to.
Theorem 3.4. For arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, Mechanism 3.3 runs in time polynomial in n, m, and 1/ǫ, and is efficient, DSIC, and, with probability 1 − ǫ, ex-ante WBB, ǫ ex-ante IR, and ex-ante in the α(1 + δ)-core, where δ = 2ǫ/W and W is the expected optimal welfare.
Proof. It's not hard to see that the mechanism runs in polynomial time, assuming welfare-alg and core-alg run in polynomial time. Computing the allocation is a single invocation of welfarealg, computing the y i , z j variables requires a polynomial number of invocations of core-alg and computing the prices and wages are simple calculations.
Efficiency and the DSIC property follow exactly as in Theorem 3.2. To argue about the remaining properties, we first study the values of y i , i ∈ N , z j , j ∈ M , that we use in the mechanism. Let y * i , i ∈ N , z * j , j ∈ M , be the corresponding values that are produced in Mechanism 3.1, i.e., the expected values over all realizations. Since core-alg is deterministic, these values are fixed and well-defined. We claim that y i ∈ y * i , y * i + 2ǫ (n + m) 2 with probability at least 1 − ǫ n + m .
Focus on a single y i and let Y be a random variable equal to the average of y r i over all samples r ∈ C. Since all values are in [0, 1], welfare is at most n and, hence, so is every y r i . This implies the variance of any such sample is at most n 2 , and the variance of their mean, Y , is at most n 2 /c. Then, Chebyshev's inequality:
for k = (n + m)/ǫ and c as in Mechanism 3.3 gives us:
Observe that our y i is simply Y shifted by ǫ/(n + m), which proves our original claim. The calculation for each z j is identical. Now, we may observe that the probability that all y i and z j satisfy the condition in our claim is at least:
At this point, given the fact that with high probability every y i and z j are at least (and very close to) the corresponding y * i and z * j , we may argue about WBB, IR, and the core. We first observe that, with W the expected optimal welfare, we get
where the σ(·) and S j , j = 1, 2, . . . , m, represent the optimal assignment for each realization. This proves the mechanism is WBB. We now focus on the expected utility of buyer i. We get
The calculation for each seller j is similar. This proves the mechanism is ǫ ex-ante IR. We finally focus on the core property. The utilities (y * , z * ) are in the α-core, as established in Theorem 3.2. As we saw in the previous paragraph, the expected utility of a buyer i is at least y * i − 2ǫ/(n + m) and the expected utility of each seller j is at least z * j − 2ǫ/(n + m). Then, for the total utility of any subset of buyers S N and any subset of sellers S M who generate expected welfare W S N , S M , we get:
Rearranging we get:
where δ is as in the theorem statement. The second inequality follows by the fact that any subset of agents are offered expected utilities at most the expected optimal welfare which, in turn, follows by WBB of the mechanism. This completes our proof of the core property and the theorem.
Welfare Maximization and Core Computation Algorithms
In this section we further discuss welfare-alg and core-alg. We begin with welafre-alg and note that in Mechanism 3.1, for which no run-time guarantees are provided, welfare-alg is simply exhaustive search and is available in all models. For Mechanism 3.3, welfare-alg must be an algorithm that solves the optimization problem of assigning buyers to sellers in polynomial time. This can be done in several models (as we explain in upcoming sections), such as the case with negative GS cost functions and the case with a single uncapacitated seller with a submodular cost function. Our core computation algorithm, core-alg, relies on the following primal-dual pair of linear programs. The primal:
and the dual:
Let W * be the optimal value of primal and let W be the optimal value among integral solutions to primal. The utilities that core-alg outputs are precisely the dual variables scaled by W/W * . The following theorem shows that these values are indeed in the approximate core.
Theorem 3.5. Let (y * , z * ) be the solution to dual and let (y, z) = (y * , z * )W/W * , where W * is the optimal value for primal and W the value of the integral optimal solution to primal. Then (y, z) gives utilities y i for the buyers i ∈ N and utilities z j for the sellers j ∈ M that are in the α-approximate core, with α the integrality gap of primal.
Proof. We get
which shows the sum of the agents' utilities equals the welfare they produce in the optimal assignment. This shows the first property of the core. Next, we argue that there exists no set of agents who can form a coalition and produce welfare higher than α times the sum of their utilities. We first observe that it suffices to focus on coalitions with a single seller and several buyers by proving that if no such coalition (with one seller) can improve their welfare, then no other coalition (with multiple sellers) can improve their welfare either. More precisely, we argue about the contrapositive: if there exists a coalition with multiple sellers that improves its members' welfare, then there also exists a coalition with a single seller that improves its members' welfare. To see this suppose there is a coalition with multiple sellers 1, 2, . . . , l, and consider the optimal assignment of buyers in the coalition to these sellers, in which S j is the set of buyers assigned to seller j. Define the improvement of the coalition as
Also define the improvement around each seller as
Clearly ∆ = j=1,2,...,l ∆ j , which implies that if ∆ > 0, then there also exists some ∆ j > 0, which in turn implies our statement that, if there exists an improving coalition with multiple sellers, then there also exists an improving coalition with one seller.
Hence, at this point, it suffices to prove that there does not exist a coalition with one seller that can produce welfare higher than α times the sum of the agents' utilities in our solution. Let this coalition be seller j and buyers S. We get:
where the first inequality follows from the first dual constraint and the second inequality follows by the fact that W/W * is at most the integrality gap α. This proves the second property of the α-core.
With respect to running time considerations, we need to be able to solve dual in polynomial time. We discuss this aspect in subsequent sections for our various models.
Single Seller
We now begin discussing the results our mechanism yields in various settings. We begin with the case of one seller. In this case, there is always a subset of buyers with size at most k j that maximize the produced welfare. This set S maximizes the corresponding coefficient in the objective function (which is precisely the produced welfare) of the primal of Section 3.1 and setting the corresponding x jS variable to 1 is an integral optimal solution to the program. This suggests the integrality gap α is equal to 1 in the statement of Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.6. For the case of a single seller, Mechanism 3.1 is efficient, ex-ante BB, DSIC, ex-ante IR, and ex-ante in the core.
We now argue that Mechanism 3.3 can be applied to the case of a single submodular uncapacitated seller. First of all, the argument of the previous paragraph remains: there is some welfare-maximizing subset of buyers and, similarly, the integrality gap will be 1. Now we need to show that we can run welfare-alg and core-alg in polynomial time. With regard to welfarealg, our problem involves minimizing a (non-monotone) submodular function, which is known to be solvable in polynomial time. This also gives us the integral optimal of primal we need in core-alg. All that remains is to show we can solve the dual of Section 3.1 in polynomial time. This program has an exponential number of constraints, however, given a separation oracle, we can use the ellipsoid method to solve it in polynomial time. Checking the non-negativity constraints is trivial. We may rewrite the other constraint as
With given y i , z j variables, the left hand side is a submodular function, which as argued above can be minimized in polynomial time. If this minimum value is non-negative then all constraints of this form are satisfied. We then get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7. For the case of a single seller and for arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, Mechanism 3.3 runs in time polynomial in n, m, and 1/ǫ, and is efficient, DSIC, and, with probability 1 − ǫ, ex-ante WBB, ǫ ex-ante IR, and ex-ante in the (1 + δ)-core, where δ = 2ǫ/W and W is the expected optimal welfare.
Negative Gross Substitutes Cost Functions
We now study the case with capacitated NGS sellers. By maximizing the negative of the objective in primal, we get the problem of maximizing a function satisfying the GS property subject to allocation constraints. It is well known that in this case, the optimal solution to the linear program will be integral. This implies that again α = 1. We then get the following corollary. The solution to primal also gives us our polynomial time welfare-alg and our integral solution to primal for core-alg. Then, for Mechanism 3.3, it remains to give a separation oracle for dual. Rewriting the first family of constraints as we did in Section 3.2, we get an NGS function on the left hand side. As we observed, the function can be minimized in polynomial time (since it is equivalent to GS maximization). If the minimum is non-negative then all constraints of this form are satisfied. Checking the non-negativity constraints is trivial. Corollary 3.9. For the case of capacitated NGS sellers and for arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, Mechanism 3.3 runs in time polynomial in n, m, and 1/ǫ, and is efficient, DSIC, and, with probability 1 − ǫ, ex-ante WBB, ǫ ex-ante IR, and ex-ante in the (1 + δ)-core, where δ = 2ǫ/W and W is the expected optimal welfare.
Approximately Efficient Mechanism
In this section, we present a poynomial time mechanism that addresses the case of intractable models, such as multiple submodular sellers. Our mechanism will achieve approximate efficiency and will be in the approximate core. The mechanism requires access to an algorithm that computes a convex combination of integral solutions that is equal to 1/γ times the fractional optimal solution of the primal of Section 3.1, for some given γ. We discuss this algorithm, which we call approxwelfare-alg, further in Section 4.1. We now present the mechanism's specifics. • Allocation Rule: Given the reported values v ij for i ∈ N, j ∈ M , and cost functions c j : 2 N → R for j ∈ M , let x * be the optimal solution to the primal linear program in Section 3.1. Our allocation is the lottery x that is output by approx-welfare-alg.
• Pre-processing: Sample a set C of c = n 2 (n + m) 5 /ǫ 3 realizations of agent types, for some small parameter ǫ > 0. For every sample r ∈ C, compute buyer utilities y r i , i ∈ N, and seller utilities z r j , j ∈ M , by solving the dual of Section 3.1. Let
be the slightly shifted average utility of seller j over all sampled realizations. Also, define
which can be interpreted as the extracted value of buyer i and the incurred cost of seller j under fractional solution x * .
Theorem 4.2. For arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, Mechanism 4.1 runs in time polynomial in n, m, and 1/ǫ, and is γ-efficient, DSIC, and, with probability 1 − ǫ, ex-ante WBB, ǫ ex-ante IR, and ex-ante in the γ(1 + δ)-core, where δ = 2ǫ/W and W is the expected welfare of the mechanism.
Proof. It is clear to see that the mechanism runs in polynomial time since it makes only polynomially many invocations to algorithms with polynomial running times. The fact that the mechanism is (in expectation) γ-efficient follows directly by the fact that the output is a lottery over integral solutions that is precisely a 1/γ approximation to the fractional optimal solution of primal. The (expected over lottery realizations) utility of a buyer i ∈ N is
where W (x) is the objective of primal. This is precisely the expected social welfare plus some constant terms scaled by 1/γ. Then, it is in the interest of the buyer to reveal her true v ij values so that the mechanism will maximize her utility. Similarly, for a seller j we get
which proves truth-telling is an optimal strategy for each seller as well. Then we get that the mechanism is DSIC. Now, let y * i , i ∈ N , and z * j , j ∈ M , be the average utilities given by dual over all possible type realizations. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.4, we can get that, with probability at least 1 − ǫ, every
and every
Now let W * be the expected optimal value of primal and dual. Then, we get that with probability at least 1 − ǫ:
which proves WBB. We now focus on the expected utility of buyer i. We get
The calculation for each seller j is similar. This proves the mechanism is ǫ ex-ante IR.
We finally focus on the core property. For given subsets of buyers and sellers S N and S M , let W S N , S M be the welfare they can produce. We get
Approximate Welfare Algorithm
In this section, we present approx-welfare-alg, which outputs a convex combination of integral solutions that is precisely x * /γ with x * the fractional optimal solution to primal. The algorithm relies largely on the corresponding algorithm of [24] , which we call lottery-alg and use as a black box.
Lemma 4.3 (Lavi and Swamy [24] ). Let x * be the fractional optimal solution to primal and γ be such that there exists a γ-approximation algorithm for the buyer to seller assignment problem and γ also bounds the integrality gap of primal. Then, lottery-alg can be used to obtain, in polynomial time, a convex combination of integral solutions that is equal to x * /γ, under the following conditions on the welfare generated by each seller j and her matched buyers: a) it is a monotone function, b) it is 0 for an empty set of buyers, and c) we have a polynomial time demand oracle for it.
We would have liked to directly use lottery-alg as our approx-welfare-alg, however the welfare at each seller V j (S) = i∈S v ij − c j (S) is not monotone. Instead, we will usê
Lemma 4.4. For the case of submodular cost functions, running lottery-alg withV j (S) as the welfare functions gives, in polynomial time, a convex combination of integral solutions that equals x * /γ, with γ = O( √ m).
Proof. We first need to argue that lottery-alg can use theV j (S) functions, which means that each one of them: a) is monotone, b) is 0 for the empty set, and c) has a polynomial time demand oracle. Monotonicity andV j (∅) = 0 follow clearly by the definition of the function. The demand oracle is simply an algorithm that maximizes V j (·), which is a supermodular function (i.e., submodular minimization). To see that this works, let's suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that some maximizer S * of V j (·) is not maximizingV j (·). Then, there exists some S ′ that maximizesV j (·) and is minimal, i.e., any subset of S ′ does not maximizeV j (S). Then, by definition, we get V j (S * ) = V j (S * ) andV j (S ′ ) = V j (S ′ ). This leads to a contradiction since it must be the case that V j (S * ) ≥ V j (S ′ ) andV j (S ′ ) >V j (S * ). Next, we need to prove that the solution produced by lottery-alg will be x * /γ. We first show that x * is a fractional optimal solution to primal even if we replace the objective function coefficients V j (S) withV j (S) to get primal-hat. Suppose this was not true and let x ′ be an optimal solution to primal-hat that achieves objective value W (x ′ ) > W (x * ) (note W (x * ) is the objective value both for primal and primal-hat). We may assume every positive x ′ jS is such that V j (S) =V j (S), since, if this is not true, we can easily transform x ′ into this form (move all the value of x ′ jS to the corresponding variable for the minimal set that achieves the sameV j (S)). Now the objective value W (x ′ ) will be the same for both primal and primal-hat, which gives a contradiction to the optimality of x * for primal, since it would mean that W (x ′ ), which is larger than W (x * ), is the objective value for primal as well. This means we can use x * as the optimal fractional solution to give to lottery-alg, together withV j (·) functions, and compute a lottery as in Lemma 4.3.
Finally, we need to argue that every integral solution in the lottery can be converted into an integral solution for the V j (·) functions with the same welfare. For each seller j with assigned buyer set S, we can compute S * ∈ arg max S ′ ⊆S i∈S ′ v ij − c j (S ′ ) using supermodular maximization. We then keep the players in S * assigned to the seller and remove the players in S \ S * .
Conclusion
In this work we initiated the study of the two-sided cost-sharing problem. Motivated by the nature of our applications of interest (e.g., ride-sharing), we studied mechanisms that are ex-ante IR and achieve strong versions of the other standard properties: efficiency, DSIC, BB, and being in the core. Our model is simple and fundamental and gives rise to many interesting questions, a few of which we mention below:
• One approach is to enhance our model by eliminating the restriction that buyers are unitdemand.
• Furthermore, the buyers can have combinatorial values over subsets of sellers, in the spirit of [15] .
• Another approach is to attempt to relax efficiency, as opposed to interim IR, and approximate the gains from trade achieved by the mechanism of Myerson and Satterthwaite [30] . This is a challenging direction and nothing is known on approximating Myerson-Satterthwaite gains from trade beyond single parameter settings. In this sense, it would be more reasonable to start at multi-dimensional models that are less complex than ours.
• One can also try to extend our results, either by considering further classes of cost-functions, or by incorporating online components to our model (e.g., arrivals of buyers and sellers over time).
• Another direction would be to see how one can design direct-trade mechanisms where each seller's wage is covered by the subset of buyers that she serves.
